The Exceptional Case?
Perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in the United Kingdom
Laura D. Staetsky and Jonathan Boyd
The Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) is a London-based independent research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in Britain and across Europe by conducting research and developing policy in partnership with those best placed to influence Jewish life.

Authors

Dr Laura D. Staetsky is a Senior Research Fellow at JPR and Visiting Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge. Her expertise spans the disciplines of demography, applied statistics and economics, and her recent work has focused on the demography of the developed world with a particular interest in mortality and migration, and on Jewish and Israeli demography. She holds an MA in demography from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a PhD in social statistics from the University of Southampton. A former researcher and analyst at the Central Bureau for Statistics in Israel and at RAND Europe, her recent publications include Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey (JPR, 2014, with David Graham and Jonathan Boyd); “Jewish mortality reconsidered”, Journal of Biosocial Science, Vol. 46 (forthcoming); and Immigration from the United Kingdom to Israel (JPR, 2013, with Marina Sheps and Jonathan Boyd).

Dr Jonathan Boyd is Executive Director of JPR. A specialist in the study of contemporary Jewry, he is a former Jerusalem Fellow at the Mandel Institute in Israel, and has held professional positions in research and policy at the JDC International Centre for Community Development, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the United Jewish Israel Appeal and the Holocaust Educational Trust. He holds a doctorate in education from the University of Nottingham, and an MA and BA in modern Jewish history from University College London, where he specialised in the history of antisemitism. The editor of The Sovereign and the Situated Self: Jewish Identity and Community in the 21st Century (Profile Books, 2003), his most recent reports include Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey (JPR, 2014, with David Graham and Laura Staetsky); Jewish life in Europe: Impending catastrophe or imminent renaissance (JPR, 2013); The 2011 Census: Initial insights about the UK Jewish population (JPR, 2012, with David Graham and Daniel Vulkan); Home and away: Jewish journeys towards independence (JPR, 2011, with David Graham); and Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel (JPR, 2010, co-authored with David Graham).

This report is based on data gathered by JPR in partnership with Ipsos MORI, for a study commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). We are particularly indebted to all of our research partners, and in particular, our fellow members of JPR’s academic team who undertook research for the FRA and submitted a full report to them outlining our conclusions: Professor Eliezer Ben-Rafael (Tel Aviv University), Professor Erik Cohen (Bar-Ilan University), Professor Sergio DellaPergola (Hebrew University), Professor Lars Dencik (Roskilde University), Dr Olaf Glöckner (Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum) and Professor András Kovács (Central European University), as well as Mike Whine and Mark Gardner (Community Security Trust) and Professor David Feldman (Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck University London).
Contents

1 Introduction 3
   Background 3
   Jews in the UK 4
   Antisemitism in the UK 6

2 The findings 9
   Who responded to the survey? 9
   Are the respondents representative of the UK Jewish population? 11

3 Perceptions of antisemitism 13

4 Defining antisemitism 16

5 Experiences of antisemitism 19

6 Emotional and behavioural responses 24
   Reporting 26

7 Do different types of Jews perceive and experience antisemitism differently? 28
   Religiosity matters 28
   Age concern 29
   Gender gap 31
   Educational effects 31
   Geographical differences 32
   Data checks 32

8 How does the UK compare to other countries in Europe? 33

9 Conclusions 35

10 Appendix: Methodology 38
    Questionnaire and sample design 38
    Measures of quality control 39
    The sample and the population 39
    Data calibration 40
    Methodological conclusion 41

11 Bibliography 42
1 Introduction

Background
In summer 2011, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) issued a call to academic institutions and research institutes to tender for a European Union sponsored study of the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews in Europe. The FRA is one of the EU’s specialist agencies, established to provide empirical data and expert advice to the EU and Member States on how to safeguard the fundamental rights of people living in Europe. Its work has looked at racism and xenophobia against multiple ethnic and religious minorities, and although the FRA (and its predecessor organisation, the European Union Monitoring Centre) had previously surveyed European Jewish leaders and been involved in work to gather data on antisemitic incidents, this initiative was the first attempt to survey the general Jewish population.

Surveying Jews in Europe is notoriously complex. The Jewish population is small: of the 503.5 million people living in the EU’s 28 Member States, only 1.1 million are Jewish, which makes them extremely rare on national population panels used for random probability sampling. Moreover, Jews are not dispersed equally across the continent, but are rather concentrated in a few key countries (an estimated 85% live in just four countries – France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Hungary), and close to half live in just two cities – Paris and London. Thus constructing a continent-wide picture that is not entirely dominated by these major centres is very difficult. Jews live throughout Europe – the population of the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy stands at about 30,000 in each country, and a further 15,000 live in Sweden and 12,000 in Spain. After that, with the exceptions of Switzerland and Turkey (neither of which are in the EU), no other Jewish population reaches 10,000, but there are a few thousand – or at least a few hundred – in every other country in Europe.\(^1\) To generate equally valid data from Jews in all these countries when the population sizes are small to begin with, yet differ significantly in size from one another, rendered that task even more complicated.

Furthermore, with the partial exceptions of Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy, no Jewish community holds a comprehensive list of Jews living in the country from which to randomly sample the Jewish population. As a result, convenience sampling typically needs to be used, which is highly unlikely to generate data representative of the Jewish population as a whole. In certain countries, the extant sample can be weighted using credible baseline data (e.g. from a national census or robust community statistics), but this is by no means a widespread norm. Indeed, very importantly in European Jewish research terms, no government statistics on religion are gathered at all in France, for example, because of the strongly-held belief in laïcité (secularism) and in the separation of Church and State.

These challenges can be handled in different ways if the research brief is limited to a study of the Jewish population in a single country. However, in this instance, the FRA was eager to generate comparative data across different European Jewish populations – to differentiate, for example, between the perceptions and experiences of Jews living in France and those living in Hungary. Weighting the data from one country but not from another may well have generated more representative data in those instances where weights could be employed, but would have simultaneously weakened any comparisons drawn between different populations. Thus a method needed to be developed that would maximise the chances of both generating representative data and being able to validly compare countries against each other.

After the FRA conducted a series of consultations with researchers from JPR and elsewhere, it became clear that two possible methodological options existed. The preferred method, Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS), required researchers to accurately and proportionally segment each national Jewish population into its main component parts (according to available variables – e.g. geography, denominational affiliation, etc.), identify a proportionate number of ‘seed’ respondents in each segment, and ask them both to complete the questionnaire and to

---

pass it on to a specified and deliberately limited number of Jews whom they knew. The literature on RDS demonstrates that after several referral waves, the sample begins to resemble the target population as a whole. Nevertheless, RDS had only been attempted once before when surveying Jews in Europe, and in that instance, interviews were conducted face-to-face and the data gathering process had taken in excess of a year. The budget for the FRA survey was simply too small – and the timeline too short – to consider this option, so the FRA team elected to adopt the method online. Because they were fully aware that this would be highly experimental, the tender requirements included a second back-up approach – an open, online survey. The FRA knew that, from a social science perspective, this constituted the least methodologically robust method, but they were also conscious that it was almost certainly the most viable way to generate any data at all.

In tendering for the project, JPR partnered with the international research agency Ipsos MORI, and built a multi-national team comprised of social scientists with expertise in surveying Jews in Europe, and experts in contemporary European antisemitism, notably from the Community Security Trust (CST) and the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck University London. The fact that JPR won the tender demonstrates the Institute’s standing in the field of European Jewish social research; no other university or research institute in the world was able to compete with our bid. The additional fact that we completed the survey on budget and within the twelve months allocated further proves the expertise of our research and administrative team – in addition to questionnaire development, survey dissemination, data monitoring, analysis, and report-writing, the project involved nine separate studies in eleven different languages, liaison with hundreds of individuals, Jewish organisations, agencies and media outlets across Europe, and four months of constant media monitoring and reporting with our partners at CST. This study undoubtedly constitutes the largest research project JPR has ever undertaken, and ultimately has generated one of the most extraordinary datasets ever gathered on Jews in Europe.

Our formal paid work on the project ended in December 2012 when we submitted our final report to the FRA. Subsequently, the FRA team prepared the report for publication, and it was eventually launched in advance of a major EU seminar in Vilnius in November 2013. Their report complies with the Agency’s brief – to publish comparable data across each of the countries surveyed. However, we remained deeply conscious that it is possible to examine the data for each country individually, to assess the extent to which the findings are representative of the Jewish population in each country, and, where possible, apply weight to generate more robust results. Indeed, we considered this to be a critical task – whilst the broad comparisons drawn between countries are undoubtedly valid (e.g. that antisemitism in France is unquestionably worse than it is in Britain), the percentages quoted needed to be tested and possibly adjusted for accuracy.

The survey took place in nine EU Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In total, 1,468 responses to the survey were obtained from across the United Kingdom. This report is the first in a series of individual country reports that present the data after it has been assessed for representativeness, and, where necessary, weighted accordingly. An explanation of our thinking in the case of the UK data is outlined in the appendix to this report. Interestingly, we found no need to weight this particular dataset; upon assessment, the application of weights made little, if any, difference to the results.

**Jews in the United Kingdom**

The UK is home to the world’s fifth largest Jewish population, and Europe’s second largest. It reached a historical peak of an estimated 420,000 in the 1950s, but has since declined to its current level of just below 300,000. Interestingly, this decline appears to have now stopped; the most recent data from the UK 2011 Census indicate that the population has stabilised, primarily because growth in the strictly Orthodox, or haredi, sector

---


appears to be off-setting decline elsewhere. This can be clearly evidenced by looking at household size and age distribution data for these two different communities – average household size in the haredi population is at least 4.5 and average age is 27 years; for the non-haredi Jewish population the equivalent figures are 2.4 and 44 years.

An estimated two-thirds of all Jews in the UK live in Greater London and the surrounding counties, a proportion that has remained largely stable since the mid-nineteenth century. The second largest population centre is Manchester, which also has a growing haredi community; other significant communities can be found in Leeds, Glasgow and Gateshead. However, there are at least some Jews living in every Local Authority in England and Wales, so the population can be characterised as both geographically concentrated and dispersed.

The largest synagogue movement is the United Synagogue, which is central Orthodox, and in 2010 accounted for 55% of all synagogue members by household. However, its share declined by a third between 1990 and 2010, although the rate of decline slowed over that period. There are two progressive movements: the larger, Reform, represents just under 20% of all synagogue members by household; the smaller, Liberal, represents approximately 9%. Taken together, their share has remained largely static over the same period. The latest household membership figures for haredim stand at 11%, although, as previously stated, household size in this part of the community is significantly higher than elsewhere, and there is evidence to suggest that the haredi population may be growing at a rate as high as 4% per annum. The UK also has a small, but rapidly growing Masorti movement, and a slightly larger but slowly declining Sephardi stream. Relative to many other Jewish populations in the world, synagogue affiliation rates in the UK remain quite high, although approximately 30% of all Jewish households do not belong to a synagogue.

An estimated 60% of all Jewish children in the UK now attend Jewish schools, up from approximately 25% in the 1970s, although these figures include haredi children where Jewish schooling is universal. Beyond the haredi population, approximately 50% of all Jewish children attend a Jewish primary school (age 4-11). The proportion attending Jewish secondary schools is lower, although provision has increased in recent years with the opening of two new schools – Yavneh College (central orthodox) in 2006, and the Jewish Community Secondary School, or “JCoSS” (cross-community) in 2010. Together, these two schools have provided 330 new places for children per annum.

Beyond synagogues and schools, London, in particular, has a vibrant Jewish scene. The fourteenth largest urban Jewish population in the world, and the second largest outside of Israel and the United States, its cultural events include the highly popular annual Jewish Book Week and Jewish Film Festival. The UK also hosts the largest Limmud conference in the world (the event originated in the UK, but has been replicated in over sixty communities worldwide), alongside numerous other smaller initiatives. Arguably, the most significant development to have taken place in British Jewry recently is the establishment of JW3, a new multi-million pound Jewish community centre in north London which opened in September 2013, and has added yet more diversity and vitality to Jewish cultural activity in the city.

Apart from those already mentioned, the most prominent organisations operating within the Jewish community in Britain are two representative bodies – the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council – both of which are engaged in political advocacy on behalf of the community. The largest welfare charities are Jewish Care, which focuses its efforts primarily on the elderly, and Norwood, which


8 Board of Deputies of British Jews data.

works with disadvantaged children. The United Jewish Israel Appeal (UJIA) is the community’s largest Israel charity, supporting a range of projects in the Galilee region, and investing heavily in the community’s youth movement infrastructure in Britain and Israel experience programmes for young people. The Community Security Trust (CST) monitors antisemitic incidents, provides security at Jewish community events, and liaises with government, police and national security services to help combat anti-Jewish hate crime and discrimination.

Antisemitism in the United Kingdom

Unlike many other Jewish communities in Europe, the Jewish population of Britain was largely unaffected by the Holocaust directly. There was a fairly small Sephardi Jewish community in Britain from the seventeenth century, but most of the ancestors of the contemporary population migrated to Britain from Eastern Europe between 1881 and 1914, fleeing persecution and seeking a better life. Some fled Europe later, and just in time: Britain received a new wave of some 55,000 Jewish immigrants from Nazi Germany in the 1930s, including, most famously, almost 10,000 unaccompanied children on the Kindertransporte of 1938 and 1939. However, because the Nazis failed to conquer the UK, the population was spared the horrors of genocide.

Moreover, while British Jews undoubtedly encountered antisemitic prejudice and discrimination in the first half of the twentieth century, it was, in the words of historian Todd Endelman, “more social and cultural than political”. It most commonly took the form of membership bans from clubs, admission quotas at public schools, and refusal of services for spurious reasons. Occupational discrimination, hostile comments and hateful remarks were not unusual, but physical attacks occurred only sporadically. Ideological antisemitism existed, led most notably by Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists in the 1930s, and whilst its often violent tactics sowed widespread terror and fear, it never garnered popular support: the BUF never won a seat in parliament, nor even on a local council. Indeed, perhaps because of the rupturing of Christian unity in post-medieval Britain, or the adoption of liberal ideas in early modernity, Britain was unusually tolerant towards its Jews, certainly when contrasted with most other European states. There was undoubtedly pressure on the new Jewish immigrants and their families to become more English, but many adapted their behaviour willingly, in search of acceptance and upward mobility. British Jews may often have felt compelled to compromise or deny their Jewishness, but were essentially spared murderous pogroms, boycotts and show trials. They paid a price in the erosion of Jewish identity, but not in extreme violence.

The interplay between antisemitism and events in Israel took a unique form in Britain because of the British Mandate. The British controlled Palestine from 1917 to 1948, and the immediate post-war relations between the British government and the leaders of the Yishuv (the Jewish community of Palestine) took a distinct turn for the worse as the Zionist movement became increasingly antagonistic towards the British in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Despite supporting and even championing Zionism previously, Clement Attlee’s post-war Labour government failed to honour Britain’s earlier commitments, and most painfully, kept Palestine’s doors closed to the hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors interned in Europe’s Displaced Persons camps. In response, Zionist underground groups initiated a campaign of violence against the British, most famously bombing the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the British administration, in an attack in 1946 that claimed ninety-one lives. When the Zionist military group, the Irgun, hanged two British sergeants the following year in retaliation for the hanging of three of its members, anti-Jewish violence erupted on the streets of Britain.

As was the case in many other parts of the Jewish world, the love affair of British Jews with Israel did not really take off until 1967. Fearful that a second Holocaust in Israel was imminent on the eve of the Six-Day War, many were profoundly influenced by Israel’s military victory, and as Endelman has argued, Israel subsequently became “the most potent force for keeping Jews within the communal fold.” Indeed, for many at this time,


11 Ibid.
Zionism became the religion of British Jews; the year after the war saw an almost unprecedented rise in British Jewish migration to Israel, and in an increasingly secular British society, identification with Israel provided both a reason for being Jewish and a sense of pride in it. Israel was also commonly lauded in the British media at the time, regarded as the biblical David in a battle against the belligerent Arab Goliath, all of which provided a context in which an increasingly assimilated British Jewish population could feel comfortable with this particular component of their Jewishness.

At the same time, hostility towards Jews undoubtedly weakened. With large-scale migrations from Africa and the Indian sub-continent, Britain was becoming a more diverse society, and whilst racist and antisemitic factions continued to rear their heads, they remained a fringe phenomenon, much as the BUF had in the 1930s. Indeed, in 2009, when British National Party leader Nick Griffin controversially appeared on one of the BBC’s flagship current affairs programmes, Question Time, he was roundly condemned by the other panel members, booed by the audience, and the BBC studios themselves came under siege by hundreds of protestors. Nevertheless, many Britons today appear to hold rather inconsistent views towards the growing immigrant population: in a 2008 survey, 62% agreed with the statement “there are too many immigrants in Britain”, but 71% believed that “immigrants enrich our culture.” Furthermore, to the extent that comparative data exist, anti-Muslim attitudes in Britain appear to be more prevalent than antisemitic attitudes, although the toxicity of those attitudes is considerably harder to measure.12

Since the Second World War, Jews have increasingly become part of mainstream British society. Margaret Thatcher famously appointed five Jews to her cabinet, an unprecedented number that prompted a previous Conservative Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, to quip that there were more “old Estonians in the cabinet than old Etonians.” Evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of Jews today feel very much at home in Britain – indeed, 83% of UK-based respondents to the present survey reported that their feelings of belonging to Britain are either “very strong” or “fairly strong.” The rates of aliyah (emigration to Israel) also remain low: in the decade between 2001 and 2010, only an average of 465 Jews per annum moved to Israel with fairly limited variation from year to year.13 Significant jumps in aliyah rates typically occur for one of three reasons – (i) as a response to increased antisemitism (e.g. for Jews in Arab lands post-1948); (ii) opportunism following years of repression (e.g. in the 1990s from the Former Soviet Union); or (iii) due to a sudden outpouring of support for Israel (e.g. following the Six-Day War in 1967). Given that the second of these does not apply to the UK, and the third has not happened recently, it is reasonable to assume that many Jews feel broadly comfortable living in the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, as support for the Palestinian cause has grown in Britain, particularly since the first intifada in the late 1980s, a debate has raged about the interplay between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. Some argue that a ‘new antisemitism’ exists, based on antagonism towards, or open hatred of, the State of Israel, as contrasted to previous forms of antisemitism that were directed towards Jews as a distinct group. Others counter that this antipathy is simply legitimate criticism of the Israeli government, and a genuine attempt to force a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The adoption of Palestinian self-determination as a cause célèbre is driven by multiple reasons – political, economic, social and demographic – yet there is clear scope for violence in the Middle East to spill over into violence in Britain. Indeed, spikes in the number of antisemitic incidents can now be seen every time Israel is involved in a significant military operation. Between 2007 and 2011, an average of 55 incidents were reported to the Community Security Trust (CST) each month, and rarely reached above 70; in January 2009, in the midst of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, there were 289.14 Whilst the CST’s criteria are clear and robust, assessing whether or not an incident is antisemitic or not can be complex; in certain instances it

is unquestionable, but it starts to become more contentious when campaigners choose to boycott Israeli universities or companies in an attempt to force a political solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, or when they accuse Israel of being an apartheid state. The 1999 Macpherson Report, a landmark British government document written following the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence, controversially defined a racist incident as “any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person”, yet when different Jews define antisemitism in different ways, there is plenty of scope for debate.\textsuperscript{15}

Furthermore, not all antisemitism in Britain today is necessarily directly related to incidents in Israel. The number of incidents that occur during the High Holy Day period (typically September and/or October) are commonly higher than average, due to the higher than average number of identifiably Jewish people seen in public then.\textsuperscript{16} Being visibly Jewish certainly renders one more prone to harassment, discrimination or assault (the data in this report demonstrate that), and with the rapid growth of the most Orthodox sections of the British Jewish community, increasing numbers of Jews may be more vulnerable to attack. Yet, paradoxically, any casual observer of Jews in Britain would note an increase in self-confidence among British Jews in recent decades, evidenced by the growing number of kippot (skullcaps) worn in public places and the prominence of major Jewish events and rallies in the public sphere. In essence, antisemitism in Britain remains rather a conundrum. It continues to be one of the top issues on the Jewish communal agenda, and efforts to combat it generate substantial funding. At the same time, British Jews have arguably never before been so confident about their Jewishness, and so open about displaying it in public.

The comparative data from the FRA survey demonstrate that Britain remains a considerably more tolerant and accepting environment for Jews than certain other parts of Europe. Yet analysed on its own terms, questions remain. How safe and secure do Jews in Britain feel today? How commonly do they experience harassment, vandalism, violence or discrimination? To what extent do they report incidents when they occur, and to whom? How aware are they of their legal rights? And, ultimately, what level of antisemitism is tolerable? This report examines all of these questions, and, fundamentally, provides a lens through which Jews in Britain and those entrusted to take care of them will be able to assess empirically the state of antisemitism in the country today.


\textsuperscript{16} CST, Antisemitic Incidents Report 2013, op. cit.
The Findings

Who responded to the survey?
Besides its main focus on perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in the United Kingdom, the survey collected plenty of information on the demographic, socio-economic, and cultural characteristics of British Jews, namely, their patterns of identification with Jewish community life and with Israel. This brief section presents selected characteristics of the 1,468 respondents, to provide an idea of the sample’s socio-demographic profile.

In accordance with established survey practice, one would expect to find a slight majority of female respondents in a social survey, and even more so in a survey of European Jews, as aged populations always have a surplus of women (see age distributions below). This, however, is not the case in the United Kingdom sample (and, in fact, in the majority of other country samples collected in this survey): males constitute a clear majority of 58% of the sample.

When examining the age of respondents, it is clear that the sample is dominated by mature adults, i.e. those in the 55-69 age band, as can be seen by the clear ‘hump’ in Figure 1. There are relatively small proportions of the youngest and the oldest age groups. As one would expect on the basis of the age composition, a majority of the respondents in the sample, (73%), is either married or cohabiting. Single individuals constitute 15% of the sample.

The vast majority of respondents in the sample are long-term residents in the United Kingdom. 81% have lived in the UK for all, or nearly all of their lives, and a further 14% have lived in the country for ten years or more. Most (80%) were born in the UK; of the remainder, they were most commonly born somewhere else in Europe (6%), in the United States (4%) or in Israel (3%). 92% of survey respondents have United Kingdom citizenship, 6% have citizenship of another country in the European Union and 9% have Israeli citizenship. Citizenship of another country in the European Union and/or Israel could have been the only type of citizenship that the respondents have, or it could be their second citizenship. 84% live either in Greater London, or another major urban centre in the UK. 11% live in a town or small city, and the remainder in more rural areas.

Over 80% of respondents in the United Kingdom sample reported a very strong (52%) or fairly strong (32%) sense of belonging to the UK. There is a strong relationship between their country of birth and the respondents’ feelings of belonging: about 90% of the United Kingdom-born respondents reported a very strong or fairly strong sense of belonging to their country, in contrast to...
60% of the respondents who were born outside the United Kingdom.

In order to explore further the extent to which respondents’ Jewish and British identities interact, we used two of the questions included in the survey (in which respondents were asked to rate the strength of their Jewish identity on a scale of 1 to 10, and to rate how strongly they feel attached to the UK) to examine the acculturation levels of Jews in this sample into the UK. We analysed the data through the lens of the Berry typology of acculturation (Berry 1976, 1984, 1990, 1997, 2001; Cohen 2011), which defines four strategies that may be used to negotiate the interplay between an ethno-cultural group and wider society. Berry’s categories of acculturation are based on positive or negative attitudes the ethno-cultural group holds regarding the group and wider society. A group with positive attitudes towards the maintenance of their own culture and identity alongside positive attitudes towards wider society is said to manifest the strategy of integration. Assimilation refers to positive attitudes towards wider society and negative attitudes about the group’s identity. The strategy of separation refers to negative attitudes towards wider society and positive attitudes about the group. The state of having negative attitudes towards both the group and society is termed marginalisation. This typology may be applied to any ethno-cultural group. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the vast majority of Jews in the UK (74%) are ‘integrated’, demonstrating strong Jewish identities alongside strong attachment to the UK.

Concerning educational qualifications, the sample is comprised of a large proportion of respondents with a university degree (or equivalent) or above – indeed, 73% fall into this category.

About 78% of respondents belong to a synagogue. Almost 40% belong to a mainstream Orthodox synagogue (Independent, United Synagogue or Federation of Synagogues) and about 30% belong to a Reform, Liberal or Masorti synagogue. Only 4% of the respondents belong to a haredi synagogue (see Figure 3).

However, synagogue membership is just one of the ways the survey employed to measure the Jewish identities of respondents. When asked which of a set of terms comes closest to describing their Jewish identity, 30% identified as ‘Traditional’, and a further 16% as ‘Orthodox or haredi,’ 20% self-identified as ‘Reform/Progressive. Of the remainder, 29% said they were ‘Just Jewish’, 3% said they were ‘Mixed’, and a further 3% responded ‘None of these.’
Among other things, these findings provide an important insight into the probable physical appearance of the survey respondents – a factor which can have real consequences as to the likelihood of experiencing an antisemitic attack. An absolute majority of survey respondents is not very religiously observant and therefore, typically, not visibly Jewish.

Nonetheless, the decision to display one’s Jewishness outwardly, for example by wearing distinctive clothing, does not necessarily correlate with the extent to which one feels Jewish. In addition to the questions on Jewish identity, respondents were asked how religious they were on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 meant ‘not at all religious’ and 10 ‘very religious’. Another similar question was asked about the strength of their Jewish identity, where 1 means very low strength and 10 means very high strength. Categories of Jewish identity are presented in Figure 4 with their respective average scores of religiosity and strength of Jewish identity.

As one might expect, ‘Orthodox or Haredi’ Jews have the highest religiosity score (about 8) while the ‘Traditional’ score about 6. The ‘Traditional’ are followed by ‘Reform/Progressive’ with a score of about 5. ‘Mixed’, ‘Just Jewish’ and ‘None of these’, in this order, have the lowest religiosity scores, all within the range of 2.6–4.1. These findings can be treated as an indication that there is a reasonably clear meaning to the categories of Jewish identity in terms of religiosity. Orthodox or Haredi, Traditional, and Reform/Progressive would probably be intuitively arranged by many observers in this order of their religiosity.

Orthodox or Haredi (score 9.4), ‘Traditional’ (score of 8.8) and Reform/Progressive (score of 8.1) also exhibit a hierarchy in terms of the strength of Jewish identity, although the distinctions in this regard are less acute. They are followed by ‘Just Jewish’, who score only slightly lower than Reform/Progressive. ‘Mixed’ and ‘None of these’ have the lowest Jewish identity scores (around 5.5).

About 90% of the respondents in the sample have spent time in Israel, the majority on holiday, and a significant minority of about 17% of all respondents have lived there for more than a year. About 70% have family and relatives in Israel.

Are the respondents representative of the Jewish population of the United Kingdom?

Based on the data outlined above and other similar socio-demographic data from the survey, the characterisation of the sample respondents can be summarised as follows. They contain a majority...
of males and a significant proportion of ‘mature adults’. Most are urban residents, were born in the United Kingdom and/or spent all or most of their lives there. The majority has a strong sense of belonging to the UK. They are highly educated and economically secure. Nearly all of the respondents are Jewish by birth and an absolute majority is Ashkenazi. Non-Orthodox/Non-Haredi Jews, by self-identification, constitute 85% of the sample. The majority of respondents are affiliated either to mainstream Orthodox, Reform, Liberal or Masorti synagogues, and about one fifth of the sample is not affiliated to a synagogue at all. The majority of the respondents have been to Israel and have family or relatives there.

How do these characteristics of the respondents in the sample compare to the characteristics of British Jews as a whole? Due to the nature of the sampling process, a formal test of representativeness cannot be undertaken, as probability sampling (e.g. sampling based on random selection, giving everybody in the British Jewish population a known probability of inclusion in the survey) would be a prerequisite for such a test. That, in turn, would require a master list of all British Jews or their addresses – which is not currently available. It is reasonable, however, to suspect that the communally involved may be over-represented. Because the survey utilised membership and subscribers lists held by Jewish community organisations as a first port of call (followed by referrals made by people on these lists), those Jews on the community lists may have had a larger, albeit unknown, probability of inclusion in the sample.

Is there any way to assess the representativeness of the convenience sample? Without resorting to formal tests, based on confidence intervals, one can still compare the distributions of selected socio-demographic variables in this sample to the Census-based (or community register-based) distributions of the same variables. In fact, at the questionnaire development stage, we included a number of such variables with the specific purpose of allowing some assessment of representativeness.

There are five variables for which Census-based distributions are available for comparison: age, sex, place of residence in the United Kingdom, place of birth (United Kingdom or abroad), and education. In addition, synagogue membership records of the Board of Deputies of British Jews can be used for comparison with synagogue affiliation.

Whilst the composition of the sample in terms of the place of residence in the United Kingdom and the country of birth closely approximates Census figures, this is not the case in relation to age, sex and education. Those aged under thirty and the oldest are under-represented in the sample, and ‘mature adults’ are over-represented. In addition, the sample over-represents males and people with the highest educational qualifications. An additional comparison of the sample with the Board of Deputies records reveals that the sample under-represents strictly Orthodox Jews, as well as Jews not affiliated to a synagogue.

However, when considering the question of representativeness, one has to explore the extent to which these deviations from the expected composition impact on the pattern of response to the questions on the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. In the appendix we present a more detailed assessment of the representativeness and its impact on the results. This assessment includes the development and implementation of survey weights adjusting the sample composition in terms of age, sex and synagogue affiliation. In short, we found that the implementation of weights has very little impact on the patterns of response to the questions on the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. Thus, in all subsequent sections, only the original (i.e. unweighted) findings are presented. It is our view that, with high likelihood, these findings reliably reflect the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among British Jews.
3 Perceptions of antisemitism

The survey explored the question of whether respondents feel antisemitism is a problem in the United Kingdom. As can be seen in Figure 5, respondents were rather split on the issue, with approximately half feeling it is at least "a fairly big problem", and the other half feeling that it is "not a very big problem" or "not a problem at all." In general, the clustering around the two middle positions (84% of participants can be found here) suggests that respondents believe antisemitism to be an issue in the UK, but not one that impacts regularly on their day-to-day lives.

However, a clear majority of respondents (close to 70%) indicated that antisemitism had increased in the past five years, and over a quarter of respondents said that it had increased a lot. Only a small minority (5%) said that antisemitism in the United Kingdom had decreased in the past five years (see Figure 6).

Respondents were also asked about specific antisemitic activities (antisemitic graffiti, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, vandalism of Jewish buildings and institutions, antisemitism in the media, political life and on the Internet): whether or not each of them constitutes a problem, and whether they perceived them to have increased or decreased in the previous five years.

Antisemitism on the Internet and in the media are the two types of antisemitism which are considered to be the most problematic. Almost three-quarters of the respondents indicated that antisemitism on the Internet is a problem, with over a third thinking it is a very big problem. Half of the respondents stated that antisemitism in the media is a problem, and close to a quarter maintained it is a very big problem. Only a small minority (5–10%) thought that antisemitism on the Internet and in the media is not a problem at all.

Hostility towards Jews in public places, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries and antisemitism in political life were considered a problem by 35%–40% of the respondents, and about 10% of the respondents considered these types of antisemitism to be a very big problem. Antisemitic graffiti and the vandalism of Jewish institutions were considered a problem by about one third of the respondents, but only 5% of the respondents considered these activities a very big problem in the UK (Figure 7).
The two types of antisemitism which were considered to be the most problematic – antisemitism on the Internet and in the media – were also perceived as having increased in the past five years by the largest proportions of the respondents. About three-quarters of respondents thought that antisemitism on the Internet had increased in the past five years, and close to a half thought that it had increased a lot. Over 50% of the respondents thought that antisemitism in the media had increased, and a quarter thought that it had increased a lot. Only 2–5% of respondents thought that antisemitism on the Internet and in the media had decreased.

Over half of all respondents thought that hostility towards Jews in public places had increased in the past five years, and about 40% thought that there was an increase in antisemitic graffiti, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, vandalism of Jewish buildings and institutions and in antisemitism in political life (see Figure 8).

When examining these percentages, it is important to locate them in the context of respondents’ views of other societal problems. Doing this enables analysts and commentators to draw important comparisons between respondents’ perceptions of antisemitism and other broader issues, thereby allowing them to make greater sense of the findings. Indeed, examining these data, it quickly becomes apparent that antisemitism is not the only issue that worries Jews in Britain, and that there are other social and economic problems which are regarded as more problematic than antisemitism by a large proportion of respondents.

Indeed, the proportion of the respondents who thought that the state of the economy and unemployment were very big or fairly big problems in the United Kingdom (90%-100%) was nearly twice as high as the proportion of the respondents who thought that antisemitism was a very big or a fairly big problem. In fact, compared to the other issues examined, antisemitism, along with religious intolerance and government corruption, are three social issues that are defined as a problem by the smallest proportions of respondents. Interestingly, racism in general was perceived to be a problem by a significantly larger proportion of the respondents than antisemitism in particular.

However, respondents gave a different assessment to the question of whether levels of racism and antisemitism had changed over the past five years: where 20% of respondents said that racism had increased a lot over this time frame, 30% said this in relation to antisemitism. Furthermore, 15% of respondents said that racism had decreased, but only 5% said this in relation to antisemitism (results not shown graphically).
Table 1. Respondents saying that selected social and economic issues represent a very big or a fairly big problem in the UK today (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>State of the economy</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>State of health services</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Racism</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Crime levels</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Religious intolerance</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Antisemitism</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Government corruption</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468. Respondents answering ‘Don’t Know’ are excluded from the calculation of percentages.
Defining antisemitism

There is much debate, both within and beyond the Jewish community, about what should and should not be defined as antisemitism. One established method of determining whether a belief, behaviour or incident is racist, is to ask the victims whether they believe it to be so. In that spirit, the survey presented respondents with a list of fourteen statements or attitudes relating to Jewish history, the place and role of Jews in contemporary Britain, their relationships with non-Jews, and the State of Israel. It then asked them whether they would consider a non-Jewish person to be antisemitic if he or she expressed these statements or displayed these attitudes in accordance with the following four-point scale: “definitely” antisemitic; “probably” antisemitic; “probably not” antisemitic, and “definitely not” antisemitic.

The two statements which were considered “definitely antisemitic” by the largest proportion of the respondents (close to 80%) were one which related to Holocaust denial and one which apportioned blame on Jews for the current economic crisis. Lower proportions, but nevertheless clear majorities of respondents (55-65%), stated that a non-Jew is “definitely antisemitic” if he or she says that Jews have too much power in the UK’s economy, politics or media, that Jews living in the UK are not really British, that Jews are not capable of integrating into British society, and that Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis. Lower proportions, but nevertheless clear majorities of respondents (55-65%), stated that a non-Jew is “definitely antisemitic” if he or she says that Jews have too much power in the UK’s economy, politics or media, that Jews living in the UK are not really British, that Jews are not capable of integrating into British society, and that Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis.

Figure 9. Respondents who think that a non-Jewish person is definitely or definitely not antisemitic if he or she makes the following statements/displays the following attitudes (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Definitely antisemitic</th>
<th>Definitely not antisemitic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in the UK</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews living in the UK are not considered to be British</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are not capable of integrating into British society</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interests of Jews in the UK are very different from the interests of the rest of the population</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supports boycotts of Israeli goods/products</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have recognisable features</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not marry a Jew</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always notes who is Jewish among his/her acquaintances</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews are only a religious group and not a nation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticises Israel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468. Respondents answering ‘Don’t Know’ are excluded from the calculation of percentages. Depending on the question, the proportion of respondents answering ‘Don’t Know’ is in the range 0.5%-7%.
into British society, and that Jews exploit the Holocaust for their own purposes.

At the other end of the spectrum, only a very small minority (6%) regards a non-Jew to be “definitely antisemitic” if he or she criticises Israel. Similarly, perceiving Jews as only a religious group and not a national one, as well as noting who is Jewish among one’s acquaintances, is only considered to be “definitely antisemitic” by about 15% of respondents (see Figure 9).

The particular issues of whether or not criticism of Israel is antisemitic and what kind of criticism can be considered as legitimate are greatly contested in the contemporary British Jewish community and beyond. This subject merits more detailed investigation, and the respondents in this survey provide a number of important insights. In short, whilst it is clear that criticism of Israel is not seen by many to be antisemitic per se, their responses to other statements concerning Israel demonstrate that it can become so if the criticism is couched in certain ways.

As stated above, criticism of Israel by a non-Jew is considered to be “definitely antisemitic” by just 6% of the respondents. An additional 27% of the respondents stated that it is “probably antisemitic.” However, when that criticism manifests itself in particular ways, respondents’ views become more acute. For example, a third of all respondents consider someone who boycotts Israeli goods and products as “definitely” antisemitic, and a further third “probably antisemitic.” Bringing together Israel and Holocaust imagery raises alarm bells still further: almost half of all respondents think that when non-Jews state that Israelis behave “like Nazis” towards the Palestinians they are “definitely antisemitic”, and an additional 30% thinks that they are “probably antisemitic” (Figure 10).

In light of the continuing debates, both in the United Kingdom and in continental Europe, about the acceptability of certain traditional Jewish practices, respondents were asked to what extent a prohibition of circumcision (brit milah) or the methods used to kill animals to produce kosher meat (shechita) would constitute a problem for them (see Figure 11). It is important to point out that, in contrast to the previously reviewed statements, the respondents were not asked to characterise attitudes towards such a prohibition as antisemitic or otherwise. Instead, they were simply asked to describe the impact that a possible prohibition of these practices was likely to have on them.

While there were slight differences in attitude towards brit milah and shechita (which reflect the prevalence of the practices among the Jewish population – a higher proportion of Jews circumcise their sons than observe the laws of kashrut – Jewish dietary laws), a prohibition of either one would be regarded as problematic for a majority of respondents. Over 80% of respondents would consider a prohibition of brit milah to be at least “a fairly big problem”, and close to two-thirds said it would be a “very big problem.” Only 10% said it would not be a problem at all. Two-thirds of respondents would regard any prohibition of
shechita as at least “a fairly big problem” and most of them (50% of all respondents) would regard it as “a very big problem.” Fewer than one in five would see it as “not a problem at all.”

Figure 11. Respondents who think that a prohibition of brit milah or shechita would represent a problem for them (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition of shechita</th>
<th>Not a problem at all</th>
<th>Not a very big problem</th>
<th>A fairly big problem</th>
<th>A very big problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition of brit milah</th>
<th>Not a problem at all</th>
<th>Not a very big problem</th>
<th>A fairly big problem</th>
<th>A very big problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468. Respondents answering ‘Don’t Know’ are excluded from the calculation of percentages: 29 (2%), and 30 (2%) cases, accordingly.
Experiences of antisemitism

In addition to exploring respondents’ perceptions of what antisemitism is and whether or not it has increased in the UK, the study was also keen to gather data on the extent to which people have experienced antisemitic incidents, and the nature of these cases. A number of questions in the survey related to respondents’ direct experiences of antisemitic harassment (receiving emails, messages or comments of an antisemitic nature), vandalism and physical violence, and discrimination. Other questions related to indirect experiences of antisemitism (verbal and physical violence directed at others in their family or among their friends, or antisemitic verbal and physical violence witnessed by the respondent).

Figure 12 shows the prevalence of four types of direct antisemitic experiences in the twelve months preceding the survey.

About one fifth of respondents said that they had experienced at least one incident of antisemitic harassment in the past twelve months (e.g. they had received antisemitic comments in person or online, received offensive calls, messages or letters, etc.).

What do these categories mean?

Respondents were given examples of the types of incidents that might fit into these different categories as follows:

- **Antisemitic harassment**: receiving emails, text messages, letters or cards that were offensive or threatening; receiving offensive, threatening or silent phone calls; having someone loiter, wait for you, or deliberately follow you in a threatening way; having offensive or threatening comments made to you in person; having offensive comments about you posted on the Internet (including social networking sites), because you are Jewish.

- **Antisemitic discrimination**: feeling discriminated against due to your religion, Jewish beliefs or Jewish ethnic background.

- **Antisemitic physical attack**: being physically hit, pushed or threatened at home, on the street, on public transport, in the workplace or anywhere else, because you are Jewish.

- **Antisemitic vandalism**: having your home or car deliberately damaged in some way because you are Jewish.
or were followed or waited for in a threatening way). A similar proportion said that they had experienced discrimination on the basis of their religion/faith or ethnicity over the same time frame. A much smaller proportion (2%) said that they had experienced an antisemitic physical attack, and 4% said they had been on the receiving end of an act of vandalism.

Being a direct victim of antisemitism is obviously a distressing experience, but witnessing someone else experience such an incident can also be deeply disturbing. About one fifth of the respondents said that they had witnessed someone else being subjected to an antisemitic verbal and/or physical attack, and a similar proportion said someone close to them had been subjected to such an attack.

Concerning verbal antisemitism, respondents were asked how often they had heard selected statements (which, as stated above, the majority of respondents defined as antisemitic), from non-Jews in the last twelve months (Figure 13).

Statements that most respondents regarded as definitely antisemitic – the Holocaust is a myth and that Jews are responsible for the current economic crisis – have been heard quite rarely: only 2 to 3 per cent of respondents reported hearing them all the time, and approximately one in ten said they hear them frequently. The claim that Jews are not capable of integrating into British society is even less commonly heard – four out of five respondents said they had never heard this, and most of the remainder said they had only heard it occasionally. However, suggestions that Jews have too much power or that Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes appear to be more commonplace – about 20% of respondents reported hearing these “frequently” or “all the time.” More common still is the suggestion that Israelis behave ‘like Nazis’ towards the Palestinians, which is heard by one third of the respondents frequently or all the time.

In addition to considering how frequently Jews in Britain had heard these types of comments, the survey also investigated the contexts in which they had been heard (see Figure 14). In answering the question, respondents could select more than one of the options if applicable. The main contexts where antisemitic statements were heard or seen were on the Internet (about 70% of all respondents), in social situations (about 40%), and in political speeches and discussions (also about 40%). Interestingly, academic contexts also featured high up on the list, a particularly disturbing finding given how influential intellectual thought has been in the development of modern antisemitism. It is also worth noting the low place of “Sports events” on the list. There has been a major campaign to rid sport in Britain of racism in recent years, and sporting authorities in Britain are generally quick to act in response to racist incidents. The evidence from Jews in Britain is that this appears to be working; sports events
are among the least likely places in which they encounter antisemitic comments.

Respondents were asked two additional questions in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and their feelings of safety as Jews in the United Kingdom. About one-third of respondents said that the Arab-Israeli conflict impacted greatly on how safe they feel in the United Kingdom, and another quarter said that the conflict had ‘a fair amount’ of impact on their feelings of safety. However, two in five said it had little or no impact (Figure 15).

The survey was also eager to develop a better understanding of whether Jews in the United Kingdom feel blamed by others for anything done by the Israeli government, simply because they are Jewish. As shown in Figure 16, most (close to two-thirds) responded either that this never happens, or only happens occasionally. However, of the remaining third, most reported that it happens frequently, and some said it happens all the time.

Finally, respondents were asked to characterise the identity of the perpetrators of antisemitic harassment or antisemitic physical violence. The respondents were presented with a list of fourteen pre-specified types of perpetrators, plus an option of an “other type of perpetrator” if the original list did not include an appropriate category. Multiple responses were allowed for this question: the respondents could characterise the perpetrator(s) using more than one response category. Figure

![Figure 14. Contexts in which antisemitic statements were heard or seen by Jews in the last 12 months (%)](image)

![Figure 15. Respondents reporting on the extent to which, if at all, the Arab-Israeli conflict impacts on how safe they feel as Jews in the UK (%)](image)
17 below presents the most frequently occurring types of perpetrators’ identity (more than 10% of respondents mentioned each type in relation to either harassment or physical violence).

It is clear that, both in relation to harassment and physical violence, someone with a Muslim extremist view, someone with a left-wing political view, and a teenager or a group of teenagers are the three most frequently mentioned categories of perpetrators. About a quarter of all respondents mentioned someone with a Muslim extremist view as a perpetrator in relation to harassment and over one-third in relation to physical violence. Perpetrators with a Christian extremist view and with a right-wing political view are mentioned, but by a significantly smaller proportion of the respondents: 5–9% and 7–12%, respectively. Perpetrators in a work environment and in educational establishments are mentioned with

Figure 16. Frequency of respondents feeling that people in the UK accuse or blame them, because they are Jewish, for anything done by the Israeli government (%)
a broadly similar frequency. Slightly less than one third of respondents could not categorise the perpetrators using any of the suggested types and answered ‘Someone else’ instead.

Whilst all of these categories are deliberately broad and the responses are based on victims’ perceptions of the perpetrator rather than a more objective assessment, the emphasis on “someone with a Muslim extremist view” and “someone with a left-wing political view” is also seen in the parallel data on other Western European countries – notably France, Sweden and Belgium. By contrast, it is not seen in Hungary, where the emphasis is on “someone with a Christian extremist view” and “someone with a right-wing political view.” These findings suggest that the primary source of contemporary antisemitism differs according to geography – in western democracies with large Muslim populations Jews experience a different form of antisemitism than in central and eastern European countries which became democracies relatively more recently and are home to more homogeneous populations.
6 Emotional and behavioural responses

A perception or experience of antisemitism in society can have a significant effect on how Jews feel. The survey investigated this, and explored how respondents react when they encounter it.

A significant minority worries about the possibility that they themselves might become a victim of an antisemitic act in the next twelve months: close to 30% are worried about an act of verbal abuse or harassment and 17% are worried about a possible act of physical violence (Figure 18). Apprehension about family and friends is slightly higher in both instances: one-third is worried about verbal harassment, and one-quarter about physical attack (see Figure 19).

However, as shown in Figure 20, the overwhelming majority (over 80%) of the respondents said that they never avoid Jewish events or sites out of fear for their safety as Jews, and a very similar proportion said the same about certain places in their neighbourhood. It is important to note, however, the existence of a significant minority of 15-20% of respondents who say they do avoid Jewish events and certain places in their neighbourhood, at least on occasion, due to concern for their safety as Jews.

Figure 18. Extent to which respondents are worried about themselves becoming a victim of antisemitic act in a public place in the UK in the next twelve months (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very worried</th>
<th>Fairly worried</th>
<th>Not very worried</th>
<th>Not at all worried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal insults/</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harassment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical attack</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468

Figure 19. Extent to which respondents are worried a family member or friends might become a victim of an antisemitic act in a public place in the UK in the next twelve months (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very worried</th>
<th>Fairly worried</th>
<th>Not very worried</th>
<th>Not at all worried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal insults/</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harassment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical attack</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468

Figure 20. Frequency of avoidance of Jewish events or sites and/or certain places or locations in the local area due to feelings of unsafety as a Jew, either there or on the way there (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>All the time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoid certain places in your</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid Jewish events or sites</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,468
Furthermore, about one fifth of the respondents has considered emigration or, in fact, has emigrated but subsequently returned to the United Kingdom, because they do not feel safe living as a Jew in the United Kingdom (Figure 21). Whilst there is no evidence to suggest Jews in the UK act on this in those proportions (for example, only 1.5% of Jews in Britain migrated to Israel between 2001 and 2010), it does indicate a certain level of apprehension or anxiety. Those who have considered it are more likely than average to be older and more religiously observant; younger people, as well as those with higher educational qualifications, are typically less likely to consider emigrating from the UK because they do not feel safe as Jews living in the country.

Similarly, whilst the vast majority (90%) of respondents has not moved to another area in the UK – or even considered doing so – because of concerns about their safety as Jews in their original place of residence, a small minority (8%) of respondents has done so (see Figure 22). As can be seen in Figure 23, 17% of respondents said that they avoid displaying Jewish items (such as wearing a kippah (skullcap), a Star of David or specific Jewish clothing, or having a mezuzah on their doorpost) frequently or all the time. Just under a third of respondents said that they avoid displaying their Jewishness or Jewish items occasionally. When one removes from the equation those Jews who do not do any of these anyway, the figures inevitably rise; indeed, of those to whom this issue applies, three in five avoid displaying their Jewishness in some way, at least occasionally, out of a concern that doing so might compromise their safety.

17 A mezuzah (lit. ‘doorpost’) is a piece of parchment, typically contained within a decorative case, inscribed with specific Hebrew verses from the Torah (Deut. 6:4-9 and 11:13-21) which together comprise the Sh’ma’, one of the most central prayers in Jewish liturgy. It is affixed to the doorposts of Jewish people’s homes.
Antisemitism can manifest itself in multiple ways. Historically, it was not uncommon for Jews to be treated by official bodies (the police, courts, etc.) in a prejudicial fashion. However, the evidence shown in Figure 24 indicates that discrimination of this type in the United Kingdom is rare today. Fewer than 5% of respondents expect to be treated worse than others due to their Jewishness by the police, landlords/private agencies, the courts, or a local doctor’s surgery. However, in one of the four listed instances – a private letting agent or landlord – a quarter said that they did not know what kind of treatment they might receive, suggesting a considerably higher degree of uncertainty in that instance.

**Reporting**

When antisemitic incidents occur, victims may or may not elect to report them to the police or another authority. However, do they do so? This question is important for a number of reasons. First, it allows us to estimate the completeness of police and other records of antisemitic offences. Second, it provides an indication of the relative value of different organisational records: if people demonstrate a greater willingness to report to a certain type of authority rather than another, it is possible to make an assessment of which records are likely to be the most complete. Third, it provides an indication of which authorities are regarded by respondents to be the most trustworthy.

Table 2 below presents respondents’ answers in relation to reporting of three kinds of antisemitic incidents: harassment, vandalism and physical violence. It is clear that in all three cases, a large proportion of incidents goes unreported – harassment most commonly (71%), followed by physical violence (57%) then vandalism (46%). Furthermore, it is striking to note that most incidents are not reported to the police – indeed, respondents reported only 13% of incidents of harassment and 30%–40% incidents of vandalism and violence to the police.

When asked why incidents are not reported, the most common response among Jews in Britain was that “nothing would happen or change” as
result of doing so. This finding is not unique to Jews in Britain; it was found among the Jewish populations of all countries investigated, and is similarly the most common response given by other minority groups across Europe when presented with the same question. The slightly higher rates of reporting of vandalism or physical violence may be related to the issue of the burden of proof – incidents that leave visible marks are easier to demonstrate to authorities than cases of verbal harassment. It is likely that high levels of reporting in cases of vandalism are in some way related to insurance claims; reporting is typically required in order to make a claim for damages against one’s property. Again, this finding is not unique to Jews in Britain or Jews anywhere else; it is commonly found across all groups and European Union Member States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vandalism</th>
<th>Physical violence</th>
<th>Harassment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No, it was not reported</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, it was reported (total)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to the police</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to the police and another organisation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- to another organisation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know if it was reported</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding. N=425 (harassment), N=24 (vandalism), N=70 (physical violence)
Do different types of Jews perceive and experience antisemitism differently?

In general, different groups within any population tend to have somewhat different experiences and perceptions of events. This variation may be related to differences in social status, life history and experiences, gender, education, level of religiosity or any number of other factors. All of these are likely to affect people’s perceptions, and make them more or less sensitive or attentive to particular kinds of social phenomena. They are also likely to impact on people’s actual experiences, by shaping people’s environment on the one hand (e.g. the type of neighbourhoods they live in) and making certain people’s identity more recognisable (in the case of Jews for example, Orthodox men may be more visible due to their distinctive dress).

The Jewish population of the United Kingdom has all of this diversity within it and is far from uniform; there are multiple ways of expressing one’s Jewish identity, and significant variation exists across the community. Different denominations of Judaism exist reflecting very different attitudes to religious practice and observance, and Jews differ significantly in how they choose to participate in Jewish life and express their Jewish identities. In analysing the data, we were eager to assess the extent to which any of these differences might affect respondents’ experiences and perceptions of antisemitism.

In order to better understand the effects of these differences, we examined the relationships between five particular socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education, level of religiosity and place of residence), and seven indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism:

i) Thinking that antisemitism is a problem in the United Kingdom;
ii) Thinking that antisemitism has increased in the past five years;
iii) Reporting an experience(s) of antisemitic harassment in the past twelve months;
iv) Reporting an experience(s) of discrimination on the basis of religion/belief or ethnicity in the past twelve months;
v) Worrying about becoming a victim of an antisemitic act in a public place in the next twelve months;
vi) Reporting avoidance of Jewish events or sites and/or certain places or locations in their local area due to fear for their safety as Jews;
vii) Considering emigrating, or actual emigration, in the past five years.

The results of this analysis are outlined below.

Religiosity matters
The most consistent and unambiguous relationship between the respondents’ background and their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism can be seen with regard to their level of religiosity: a greater degree of religiosity is associated with graver perceptions of antisemitism and with a greater prevalence of antisemitic experiences (see Figure 25). This can be seen in reference to all of the seven indicators, and in all cases, the correlations found are statistically significant. Expressed in simple terms, Orthodox or haredi Jews exist in a rather different world to non-Orthodox Jews when it comes to their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism.

For example, 45% of non-Orthodox Jews think that antisemitism is a very big or a fairly big problem in the United Kingdom, whereas 62% of Orthodox or haredi Jews think this is the case. About two-thirds of non-Orthodox Jews think that antisemitism has increased in the past five years, whereas three-quarters of Orthodox/haredi Jews think it has. About 40% of Orthodox/haredi Jews reported having experienced at least one incident of antisemitic harassment in the last twelve months, in contrast to 17% of non-Orthodox Jews.

Furthermore, a larger proportion of Orthodox or haredi Jews reported experiences of discrimination on the basis of religion/belief or ethnicity in the past twelve months (36% versus 16% among...
non-Orthodox Jews), and over half of Orthodox/haredi Jews are worried about becoming a victim of an antisemitic act in the next twelve months (54%), compared to 24% among non-Orthodox Jews. In addition, about 40% of Orthodox/haredi Jews avoid visiting Jewish events or certain locations out of fear for their safety, compared with 26% of the non-Orthodox, and 40% have considered emigrating or have emigrated and subsequently returned, contrasted with 16% among the non-Orthodox.

In considering this finding, it is unclear to what extent these differences are related specifically to levels of religiosity and the public visibility that comes with being a religiously observant Jew. Certainly, as previously stated, Orthodox Jews typically wear distinctive Jewish dress that marks them out as Jewish to others; by contrast, non-Orthodox Jews rarely do. This inevitably makes Orthodox Jews somewhat more vulnerable; if they can easily be identified as Jewish, they can be victimised more easily.

However, one could also hypothesise that the lifestyle of Orthodox Jews also plays its part. In general, when contrasted with non-Orthodox Jews, Orthodox Jews typically spend a greater proportion of time within exclusively Jewish circles, and value this exclusivity as a means of facilitating Jewish life and preserving and protecting the Jewish community. In so doing, a distinction is drawn between the Jewish and wider worlds, which, enhanced by aspects of Jewish tradition shaped by centuries of antisemitism, may contribute to a greater sense of anxiety in that part of the community.

**Age concern**

A relationship was also revealed between respondents’ age and their perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in five of the seven indicators.
indicators (see Figure 26). While different age groups do not differ in relation to the extent to which they believe antisemitism to be a problem, older people were more likely than younger people to think it has increased in the past five years. Indeed, approximately 70% of those aged over 40 believed it to have increased over that period, compared with about half of the youngest age group (aged 16-39).

Nonetheless, younger people were considerably more likely than older people to have experienced antisemitic harassment and/or discrimination in the twelve months prior to the survey. Among the two younger age groups (16-39 and 40-59), the proportions were in the range of 25-30%; among the 60 and over age band it was approximately 10%. Younger people are also more likely than older people to worry about becoming a victim of an antisemitic attack in the coming twelve months – about a third of those in the two youngest age bands expressed anxiety about this, compared with a quarter of those aged over 60.

The same pattern can be seen again in relation to emigration – about a quarter of those aged 16-59 have considered emigrating (or have actually emigrated and then returned) in the past five years, compared with 14% of those aged over 60.

These are striking findings that clearly demonstrate how perceptions and experiences of antisemitism can be differentiated. In essence, while younger people appear to be more likely to experience antisemitism, older people are more likely to perceive it to be on the increase.

However, the religiosity factor described above may also play a part in these findings about age. Because birth rates among Orthodox Jews are considerably higher than among non-Orthodox Jews, a much higher proportion of Jews aged under 40 is Orthodox than those in the older age bands. In essence, the younger British Jews are, the more likely they are to be religiously observant.

Figure 26. Differences between age groups on selected indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism in the United Kingdom (%)
Thus, in interpreting these results about age, this factor should also be taken into consideration.

**Gender gap**

Whilst not as pronounced as the differences shown in relation to religiosity and age, distinctions can be observed in how men and women experience and perceive antisemitism (see Figure 27). Interestingly, a larger proportion of women than men believe antisemitism to be a problem in the United Kingdom (52% compared with 45%), and believe that it has increased over the past five years (69% of women compared with 63% of men). However, in salient contrast, fewer women than men have actually experienced antisemitic harassment over the past twelve months (17% versus 24%).

In relation to the other four indicators tested (reporting experiences of antisemitic discrimination; anxiety about becoming a victim; avoidance of Jewish sites; and considering emigration), we found no significant differences between men and women.

**Educational effects**

Some distinctions can also be drawn in relation to the level of education achieved. Notably, as shown in Figure 28, those without an academic degree are more likely to think that antisemitism is a problem in the United Kingdom than those with an academic degree (63% compared to 42%). Similarly, respondents without an academic degree were noticeably more likely to be worried about becoming a victim of an antisemitic act than those with a first degree or above (40% compared to 25%). However, beyond these two findings, no statistically significant differences were found.
between educational groups in relation to other perceptions and experiences.

**Geographical differences**
Where Jews live in the UK, analysed in this instance by contrasting those based in London with those based elsewhere, appeared to have no statistical impact on any of the seven measures except for one – experiences of discrimination on the basis of religion, belief or ethnicity in the previous twelve months. Jews based in London were less likely to encounter discrimination of this type than Jews living outside of the capital (17% in London, compared to 22% outside).

**Data checks**
Whilst all of these findings are worthy of consideration, they should also be subjected to further statistical tests to ascertain more accurately which factors are most influential in determining how Jews experience and perceive antisemitism. There are limits to the conclusions one can draw from an analysis of the relationship between two variables – for example, the level of education and the extent to which individuals are worried about becoming a victim of antisemitism. This is because other factors – for example, one’s level of religiosity – may be very closely related to one’s level of education, making it difficult to determine which of these two factors is actually causing any of the differences observed. In order to overcome this, it is possible (using the methods of multivariate analysis) to test the relationship between one of the selected seven indicators (for example, thinking that antisemitism is a problem), and all of the five socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, level of religiosity, education, place of residence) simultaneously. In this instance, when we applied this advanced statistical analysis, we broadly found very similar results to those reported above, and reached the following conclusions:

**First**, the most important determinant of variation in the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism is one’s level of religiosity. Its impact is strong and statistically significant in relation to all indicators, even when other potential explanatory variables (age, sex, education, place of residence) are controlled for. In short, Orthodox and haredi Jews perceive antisemitism to be worse than non-Orthodox Jews, and experience it more commonly and acutely.

**Second**, one’s age comes next in importance to the level of religiosity. Whilst age does not impact on whether people are likely to perceive antisemitism to be a problem, it does influence other indicators. These include whether one perceives levels of antisemitism to have increased or not (where being old is associated with seeing antisemitism on the increase), and whether one has experienced harassment or discrimination, is worried about being a victim of antisemitic attack and has considered emigration (where being young is associated with reporting more antisemitic experiences, worrying more and thinking of emigration more frequently than older age groups). The association between age and these indicators of antisemitism remains intact after other determinants have been controlled for.

**Third**, where one lives is the least important determinant of variation in one’s perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. Both before and after holding other determinants constant, it appears influential only in relation to reporting experiences of discrimination.

**Fourth**, the position of one’s level of education and gender comes in between one’s level of religiosity and age on the one hand, and one’s place of residence on the other. Education and gender matter in relation to some indicators: for example, respondents with an academic degree tend to define antisemitism in the UK as less of a problem than those without a degree, and similarly, worry less about the possibility of becoming a victim of an antisemitic attack. However, education does not impact on any other indicators apart from these two.

Concerning gender, women have a greater tendency than men to define antisemitism in the UK as a problem and to see anti-Semitism as being on the increase. However, they experience and report less harassment than men.
How does the United Kingdom compare to other countries in Europe?

How do the perceptions and experiences of British Jews compare to those of Jews in other European countries covered by the survey? The results of the survey allow us to draw a number of comparisons. In this section, ten measures or indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism are presented in cross-country perspective:

i) thinking that antisemitism is a problem in the UK;

ii) thinking that antisemitism in the United Kingdom has increased in the past five years;

iii) having experience/s of antisemitic harassment in the past twelve months;

iv) having experience/s of antisemitic vandalism in the past twelve months;

v) having experience/s of antisemitic physical attack in the past twelve months;

vi) having experience/s of discrimination on the basis of religion/belief or ethnicity in the past twelve months;

vii) worrying about becoming a victim of an antisemitic act in a public place in the next twelve months;

viii) avoiding Jewish events or sites and/or certain places or locations in one's local area due to fear for one's safety as a Jew;

ix) considering emigrating or actual emigration in the past five years;

x) avoiding displaying one's Jewishness in public.

Below the British sample is compared to the samples generated by the survey in Germany, France, Belgium and Italy.

The UK emerges from this comparison as a country with a relatively low level of antisemitism. The proportion of British respondents who believe antisemitism to be a problem (48%) is the lowest relative to all of the other European Union Member States in this comparison. The proportion of British respondents who think that antisemitism has increased in the past five years is identical to proportions found in Germany and Italy, but lower than in France and Belgium (Figure 29).

Figure 29. Pattern of response to the question whether antisemitism is a problem (%)
Experience of antisemitic harassment in the past 12 months in the British sample is also the lowest in this comparison (3% and 2%, respectively) (Figure 30).

The UK also exhibits the lowest incidence on measures such as worrying about becoming a victim of antisemitic attack in the next 12 months and avoiding displaying items that indicate Jewishness (Figure 31).
Conclusions

Jews in the United Kingdom are split nearly evenly on the extent to which they regard antisemitism to be a problem in the country or not. Approximately half maintain that it is at least “a fairly big problem”, but an almost identical proportion feels that it is, at worst, “not a very big problem”. Intriguingly, taken as a group, they regard antisemitism to be less of a problem than many other political, economic and social issues in the country, notably unemployment and the state of the economy. Furthermore, most feel a strong sense of belonging to the UK. Yet, at the same time, very few – only one in twenty – feel that it is not a problem at all. Moreover, very few feel that levels of antisemitism have decreased in the past five years, and a clear majority (almost 70%) believes it to have become more acute.

Much debate has taken place in recent years about the nature of antisemitism, and whether particular behaviours or attitudes should, or should not, be termed antisemitic. These data help us to characterise them more accurately, particularly if we are to employ the Macpherson principle that one of the key determinants in assessing whether or not a particular incident is or is not racist should be whether or not the victim regards it as such. It is clear that slurs relating to the Holocaust are particularly sensitive points, most notably Holocaust denial and any sense that Jews might be exploiting their victimhood for their own purposes. Similarly, accusations that Jews have too much power, or are responsible for the current economic crisis, are widely seen as flagrant forms of antisemitism. Of these, the accusations most commonly heard by respondents are those related to Holocaust exploitation and Jewish power; Holocaust denial, or the charge of economic wrongdoing, are comparatively rare in contemporary Britain.

In contrast, simple criticism of Israel is very clearly not seen as antisemitic – indeed, only 6% of respondents would consider non-Jews “definitely” antisemitic if they criticised Israel, and two-thirds would consider them either probably or definitely not antisemitic. However, in the opinions of the Jews surveyed, the way in which criticism of Israel is manifested may subsequently render it antisemitic. One-third feels that a non-Jew advocating a boycott of Israeli goods or products is definitely antisemitic (a further third feels that it is probably so), and almost half feels that a non-Jew drawing any parallel between Israeli treatment of Palestinians and Nazi treatment of Jews is definitely antisemitic (with an additional third feeling that it is probably so). Importantly, most respondents (over three-quarters) maintained that they hear the Israel-Nazi parallel in Britain at least occasionally.

The relationship between tensions in Israel and antisemitism in the United Kingdom, which can be seen clearly in antisemitic incident data gathered by the Community Security Trust, is enhanced further by the data in this report. The Arab-Israel conflict clearly affects how safe Jews feel in the UK, albeit to varying degrees, but only one in ten respondents maintained that it has no impact on their feelings of safety in Britain. Furthermore, almost 80% of respondents said that they have felt blamed by non-Jews, at least occasionally, for the actions of the Israeli government, purely on the basis of their Jewishness.

Brit milah (the practice of circumcising Jewish baby boys) and shechita (the means of killing animals for meat that adhere to the strict standards of Jewish law) have become controversial issues in parts of Europe, as some deem them to be in violation of human and animal rights and have, successfully or otherwise, called for legal bans. From the point of view of Jews in Britain, both practices are commonly regarded as fundamental both to Jewish law and contemporary Jewish life, and both are permitted under British law. Respondents were not asked about whether or not they would consider a ban of either practice to be antisemitic, but they were asked about the extent to which a ban would be problematic to them. A clear majority (over 80%) would consider a ban of brit milah to be a problem, and two-thirds would feel similarly about a ban of shechita. The implications of these findings are not fully explored by the survey, but given the strength of feeling, it is highly probable that any move in this direction would be commonly perceived as an assault on Jewish life.

Antisemitism takes many forms, and can be found in multiple different arenas. Jews in Britain today believe antisemitism online and
in the media to be the most problematic forms. Antisemitism in politics, in public places, or in the forms of graffiti, vandalism or desecration of cemeteries are all commonly seen as less of a problem, although approximately one-third of all respondents felt that all of these were at least “fairly big” problems. To some extent, these findings square with Jews’ experiences of antisemitism – certainly, according to the respondents to this survey, violence and vandalism appear to be rather rare. However, harassment is more common – indeed, one in five said they had experienced it in the twelve months prior to completing the survey. A similar proportion claims to have experienced discrimination in some way, although it is striking to note that very small percentages of respondents maintain that this has come from the police, the court system, a private landlord or local doctor or healthcare professional.

So who is perpetrating the cases of antisemitism identified by respondents to the survey? The two most common groups identified were people with a Muslim extremist view and teenagers. One in four victims of antisemitic harassment believed that the aggressor fell into the former category, as did one in three victims of a physical antisemitic attack. The proportions identifying teenagers were marginally smaller in both types of incident – 18% of all cases of harassment, and 29% of all cases of physical violence. In addition, it is striking to note that Jewish victims of antisemitism more commonly identified their assailant as someone holding left-wing views than right-wing views.

Who are the victims? Not all Jews are equal in terms of the experience of antisemitism in the United Kingdom. Orthodox or haredi Jews are proportionately more likely to experience antisemitism than non-Orthodox Jews, not least because they can be more readily identified due to their distinctive dress. Younger Jews are more likely to become victims of harassment or physical assault than older Jews, and men more likely than women. Nonetheless, different sub-groups’ experiences of antisemitism do not necessarily correspond to their perceptions of it: older Jews are more likely to believe that antisemitism is on the rise than younger Jews, even though younger Jews are more likely to experience it; and women are more likely to believe that antisemitism is on the rise than men, even though men are more likely to experience it.

Approximately one-third of respondents are worried about themselves, or someone close to them, becoming a victim of antisemitic harassment or verbal attack, and about one in five is worried about physical assault. One half avoids wearing or carrying a distinctive Jewish item, at least on occasion, out of fear for their safety, and of the remaining half, many never display their Jewishness anyway. Whilst few avoid Jewish sites or events out of fear for their safety, and most have not contemplated migration because they do not feel safe as a Jew in Britain, the proportion of those who do fit into these categories is approximately one in five.

As has been commonly shown in social research about hate crime, many incidents never come to the attention of the relevant authorities. These data demonstrate that antisemitism in the United Kingdom is no exception. Reporting levels vary depending upon the nature of the incident, with cases of harassment least likely to be reported: an estimated seven out of ten such cases are never reported to an appropriate authority or organisation. Cases of physical violence and vandalism fare marginally better, although again, many go unrecorded: 57% in the case of physical violence, and 46% in instances of vandalism.

Whilst the findings presented in this report relate specifically to Jews in Britain, the data gathered for it was part of a larger exercise that involved the Jewish populations of several other European Union Member States. As a result, it is possible to compare and contrast the data for Jews in the United Kingdom with Jews living elsewhere in Europe (see FRA report). When these comparisons are drawn, the UK is found to have a relatively low level of antisemitism. For example, the proportion of British respondents who think antisemitism is a problem in the country (about one half) is lower than the equivalent proportions in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. The same is true in relation to experiences of antisemitic harassment in the past twelve months, experiences

of discrimination on the basis of religion, belief or ethnicity, the prevalence of worry about becoming a victim of antisemitic attack in the next twelve months, and the prevalence of avoiding displaying items that indicate Jewishness.

In the final analysis, compared with other Jewish populations in Europe, Jews in the United Kingdom generally experience less antisemitism and are less worried about it. There is evidence to indicate that most British Jews feel fully integrated into British society, and that discrimination against Jews is largely a thing of the past. At the same time, most Jews feel that levels of antisemitism have increased in recent years, particularly online, in the media, in academia and certain political contexts, suggesting that it is encountered much more commonly as a growing part of the UK’s general ambience than in its physically violent manifestations. Antisemitism is regularly connected to circumstances in Israel in several respects: tensions there are directly related to an increase in incidents here; Jews in Britain feel that they are being held responsible from time to time for the political or military decisions of the Israeli government; and hostile criticism of Israel is often experienced as antisemitism. This type of criticism, particularly when it includes calls for boycotts, divestment and sanctions, or accusations of ethnic cleansing, is especially hurtful to most, and goes some way towards explaining the finding that the perpetrators of antisemitic incidents are most likely to be identified as people with a “Muslim extremist” or “left wing political” view where these types of opinions are most prevalent.

As other JPR data have shown, the relationship of Jews with Israel is often deeply personal; Israel does not simply represent a place or a conflict, but is rather a fundamental component of Jewish identity. Similarly, the traditional Jewish practices of brit milah and shechita are also important components of Jewish life for most, and thus any suggestion that either might be banned only adds to the sense that the general atmosphere is becoming increasingly inimical to Jews. All of this affects some Jews more than others – the religiously observant and thus visibly Jewish population is at the highest risk – but there are common antisemitic motifs that induce anxiety among the vast majority of Jews, notably denial and trivialisation of the Holocaust, and accusations that Jews somehow employ their collective power to damage the common good.

These data present a compelling challenge to British policy makers. On the one hand, they demonstrate that it is wholly possible to create a society in which Jews – and, by extension, other minorities – can prosper and live in security and freedom. On the other hand, they illustrate how easy it is for minority groups to feel threatened and anxious, and how social, political and intellectual discourse, in particular, can affect that. The key question that emerges is how to continue to build a country that celebrates our common humanity, whilst simultaneously respecting, honouring and celebrating our cultural, ethnic and religious differences.

This survey of the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism among Jews marks the third time a national study of the Jewish population has been carried out in the United Kingdom, and is the second such survey to have been conducted online.²⁰ It was developed by the joint effort of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Ipsos MORI, and JPR. Ipsos MORI, a research agency with considerable experience in carrying out online surveys, administered the fieldwork on behalf of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and in partnership with JPR. However, Ipsos MORI was not involved in the analysis of data presented in this publication or in the report-writing, both of which were carried out by JPR.

**Questionnaire and sample design**

Ipsos MORI and JPR staff, in partnership with the academic team, advised on the development of the survey questionnaire and managed the data collection process. The survey questionnaire was developed on the basis of the initial template provided by FRA, taking into consideration previous JPR surveys, questionnaires used in national surveys and the views of the members of the JPR academic team.

The sample was self-selecting, and respondents were required to self-identify as Jewish, to be resident in the UK, and to be aged 16 or over. They were contacted primarily through nine ‘seed’ organisations, which represented a broad cross-section of the Jewish community and held substantial email databases. The organisations were the Jewish Chronicle, the Jewish News, the Jewish Telegraph, the Movement for Reform Judaism, Edgware K, Manchester K, ALondon, the Rothschild Foundation (Hanadiv) Europe, and the Community Security Trust. The organisations were equipped with online material in different formats: (i) a pre-designed email that they were asked to send to their distribution lists; (ii) an advertisement and a “Frequently Asked Questions” document, which they could incorporate into an existing email/electronic newsletter; and (iii) a banner advertisement, tailored to their chosen dimensions, containing the web link to the survey.

The sample was created by a ‘snowballing’ process starting with a list of email addresses belonging to the members/subscribers which was provided by the “seed” organisations. The resulting sample is, effectively, a non-probability convenience sample. It was not possible to use a random probability sampling approach for this study because a suitable sampling frame for Jewish population is not available in the United Kingdom. The survey was launched on 3 September 2012 and closed on 3 October 2012. Organisations were asked to send out the pre-designed email three times (the first on Tuesday 4 September, and follow up emails on Monday 10 and Friday 14 September). Most complied with these dates, although in certain instances, the dates were altered slightly due to organisations’ practical or operational limitations. They were also asked, immediately prior to, and for the duration of the open web survey, to place the advertisements and banners publicising the survey directly on their websites, in their printed newspapers, and/or electronic newsletters/publications.

In total 1,468 responses were obtained in the United Kingdom survey. We estimate that up to 45,000-55,000 emails were sent out through the mailing lists of the ‘seed’ organisations. However, this is not an indication of the number of people reached. Our experience of work with administrative databases teaches us that membership/subscribers figures quoted by organisations are likely to be over-estimates, and, additionally, the degree of overlap between different organisations’ memberships is unknown. In addition to the email campaign, information about the survey was promoted to people on organisational websites, by the respondents’ referrals, and by other indirect means. In sum, the true exposure of British Jews to the survey may be significant, but we cannot be certain of its precise scope nor provide an estimate of the survey response rate.

²⁰ Note that since the survey was conducted, a fourth national survey has taken place employing the same methodology. See: Graham, D., Staetsky, L. and Boyd, J. (2014). Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.
Measures of quality control

Quality of data collected in surveys can be compromised as a result of technical faults with data collection and/or conscious attempts by certain individuals and groups to impact on the patterns of response. No technical faults occurred during the fieldwork or at a later stage of data assembling. It was the second risk – of sabotage – that concerned us the most, given the sensitivity of the survey topic.

A number of measures were implemented in order to identify potential threats to the quality of the data.

1. Fieldwork was carefully monitored in real time: counts of the number of responses were conducted daily and any changes in selected characteristics of the sample were assessed throughout the duration of the fieldwork. The number of respondents increased steadily and plateaued in the last few days of the fieldwork.Sharper increases after 9 September and 17 September accorded well with the timing of reminders. The sample composition changed gradually as the survey progressed. Specifically, a larger proportion of the later respondents came from the geographical periphery and tended not to have a synagogue affiliation. These findings, however, are to be expected: as time passes, the referrals made by people on the lists of the ‘seed’ organisations are expected to attract to the survey less communally engaged participants.

2. All potential respondents could access the survey via a link that was emailed either by the ‘seed’ organisation or by an individual who completed the questionnaire. Effectively, this process allowed the respondents to complete the survey more than once. Consequently, IPSOS Mori implemented a checking process whereby each respondent’s answers were compared to the answers made by other respondents in the sample and similarities of the response patterns were assessed. The process revealed that a very small number of respondents shared similar response patterns.

3. All variables in the survey dataset were assessed for the presence of extreme and unrealistic values (i.e. outliers diagnostic) and for the presence of unlikely combinations of values across variables (i.e. logical checks). An example of the latter are logical checks across variables describing synagogue affiliation, level of religiosity and various aspects of adherence to Jewish rituals and customs: i.e. whether or not those who place themselves in a particular place on the spectrum of adherence to ritual and belief do so consistently.

4. The last question in the survey questionnaire asked for any additional comments from the respondents, offering a space to introduce free text. These comments were inspected for suspicious content (e.g. highly controversial statements, offensive comments, slurs, and rants) that may be indicative of sabotage. No suspected attempts of sabotage were identified.

5. The online mode of data collection allowed for the registration of the start and finish times for each interview. On this basis, the time each respondent took to complete the questionnaire was calculated for each respondent. The mean interview duration across the sample was 28 minutes (after the removal of a small number of outliers, see below). The interview duration variable was also examined for the presence of unusually long and unusually short times of completion, which could be indicative of sabotage or sloppy response. In total, about 4% of the respondents exhibited unusual lengths of completion times (above 2 hours or below 10 minutes). Even if all these respondents deliberately tried to impact on the response pattern, in itself an unlikely scenario, the sheer scope of such activity is evidently not large enough to have had a significant impact.

6. Finally, both the interview duration and a variable describing the source of respondents’ invitation to complete the survey were tested for the presence of associations with particular perceptions and experiences of antisemitism. No such associations were found.

The sample and the population

With 1,468 individual responses, it should be noted that this is a large sample. It is certainly sufficiently large for readers to be confident that the percentages quoted here are likely to be close to the true percentages in the population.
represented by the sample. The large sample size also means that we can compare the views of different subgroups within the sample (such as Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews). However, the question that ought to be answered is: what population precisely is represented by the FRA sample?

Does the sample represent the total population of British Jews? Unfortunately, due to the nature of the sampling process, we cannot conduct a formal test of representativeness. A formal test would include: (1) calculation of confidence intervals for sample characteristics (socio-demographic and other variables); and (2) comparison of the confidence intervals for socio-demographic characteristics to true population values, information on which can be obtained from the Census and certain community registers. In addition, confidence intervals for the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism can be assessed, not in comparison to true population values (as no such values, presumably, exist), but on their own, in order to get an impression of where the true population values are likely to be found, with given probability.

Probability sampling (e.g. sampling based on random selection, giving everybody in the British Jewish population a known probability of inclusion in the survey) would be a prerequisite for such a test. That, in turn, would require a master list of all British Jews or their addresses – which is not currently available. It is clear, for example, that because the survey utilised membership and subscribers lists held by Jewish community organisations as a first port of call (followed by referrals made by people on these lists), those Jews on the community lists may have had a larger, albeit unknown, probability of inclusion in the sample. It is reasonable to suspect that the communally uninvolved may be under-represented.

Is there any way to assess the representativeness of the convenience sample? Without resorting to formal tests, based on confidence intervals, one can still compare the distributions of selected socio-demographic variables in this sample to the Census-based (or community register-based) distributions of the same variables. In fact, at the questionnaire development stage, we included a number of such variables with the specific purpose of allowing some assessment of representativeness. The results of such assessment are presented below.

**Data calibration**

The data were calibrated using two sources of data: the 2011 Census and records from the Board of Deputies of British Jews.

In general, the geographical distribution of the sample closely matches the 2011 Census data.

In terms of **age** the sample clearly under-represents young adults (persons aged 16-34 years) and the oldest age group (persons aged 80 years and over), while it over-represents mature adults (persons aged 50-69 years). While the under-representation of young adults is rather ‘light’, the over-representation of mature adults is significant; indeed, it is almost twice the expected share of this group.

In terms of **gender**, males constitute 58% of the sample. According to the 2011 Census, the expected share of males at ages 16 and over is 48%.

In terms of **synagogue membership** two features are worth noting: the under-representation of Jews who are not affiliated to a synagogue (a proxy for the more assimilated and uninvolved Jews), and of strictly Orthodox Jews. The unaffiliated constitute 19% in the sample, whereas their expected share is nearly 37%. The members of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations (the strictly Orthodox synagogue body) constitute 5% of all respondents in the sample, and they comprise approximately 7% of the total adult population of British Jews.

In view of the existing deviations of survey sample characteristics from the actual population, a decision was taken to redress the survey sample experimentally in a way that would make it resemble the British Jewish population more closely. The existence of Census distributions of age and sex and Board of Deputies’ distributions of synagogue affiliation allow for the development of such weights.

Combined age-sex-synagogue affiliation weights were created and applied to the sample. The development of weights based on three variables proceeded sequentially. First, a set of weights
on the basis of joint age and sex distribution derived from the 2011 Census was created. Second, the sample was adjusted using this weight and the differences between the adjusted sample distribution of synagogue affiliation and the Board of Deputies’ records of synagogue affiliation were examined. On this basis, an additional weight adjusting for the differences in synagogue affiliation between these two sources was developed. Third, two weights were combined by multiplication, resulting in a single weight adjusting simultaneously for age, sex and synagogue affiliation.

The combined weight was then applied to the sample and new distributions of the principal indicators of the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism post-adjustment were compared to the pre-adjustment distributions. Importantly, adjustment for age, sex and synagogue affiliation did not change the results of the survey and/or the conclusions that one can reasonably derive from the results. For the principal indicators of perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, the difference between the unadjusted and adjusted percentages is at most three percentage points. Given this finding, we decided not to weight the dataset and present the findings in their unadjusted form. The readers can be reasonably confident that the sample respondents’ perceptions and experiences of antisemitism are broadly reflective of the total United Kingdom Jewish population, or at least of the communally engaged segment of it.

**Methodological conclusion**

All surveys have their shortcomings. Surveys based on probability sampling are typically affected by non-response, which may result in significant differences between the characteristics of survey respondents and those of the population from which the sample was derived. Surveys of populations lacking sampling frames, such as Jews in the United Kingdom, are particularly challenging. As is the case with this survey, they are often based on convenience samples. The extent to which such samples are representative of the population cannot be established with certainty.

However, there are a number of indications that this sample may be representative of the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism of Jewish people in the UK. First, monitoring of the fieldwork process showed a highly regular picture of dissemination of the survey in the community. Second, implementation of the several measures of quality control, at post-fieldwork stage, showed no unusual patterns or problems with the behaviour of respondents and the quality of information provided. Third, it has been established that the sample reflects reasonably well the diverse character of the Jewish population in the United Kingdom on many social, religious and demographic variables. Finally, where the sample does depart from baseline indicators, especially on items that were likely to affect responses to the questions on perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, experimentation with weighting showed that such deviations are unlikely to affect the patterns of response arising from the survey.

In sum, we are confident that the picture presented here is unlikely to differ markedly from the general pattern of opinion held by Britain’s Jewish population regarding the perceptions and experiences of antisemitism, or, at least, by the communally engaged segment of this population.
11 Bibliography


